I ^
OPERATION MAYIBUYE
PART 1
'The white state has thrown overboard every pretence of rule
by democratic process. Armed to the teeth it has presented, the
people with only ore choice and that is its overthrow by force
and violence. It can now truly be said that very little, if any,
scope exists for the smashing of white supremacy other than by
means of mass revolutionary action, the main content of which is
armed resistance leading to victory by military means.
The political events which have occurred in the last few
years have convinced the overwhelming majority of the people that
no mass struggle which is not backed up by armed resistance and
military of ensive operations, can hope to make a real impact.
This can be seen from the general mood of the people and their
readiness to undertake even desperate and suicidal violent
camjjaigns
of the Leballo type. It can also be guaged by their reluctance
to participate in orthodox political struggles in which
they c-xpose themselves to massive retaliation without a prospect
of hitting back. V,‘e are confident that the masses will respond
in overwhelming numbers to a lead which holds out a real
possibility
of successful armed struggle;
Thus two important ingredients of a revolutionary situation
are present:-
a) A dissillusionment with constitutional or semi
constitutional forms of struggle and a conviction
that the road to victory is through force;
b) A militancy and a readiness to respond to a
lead which holds out a real possibility of
successful struggle.
In the light of the existence of these ingredients the prosecution
of military struggle depends for its success on two
further factors
a) The strength of the enemyi This must not be
looked at statically but in the light of objective
factors, which in a period of military
struggle may well expose its brittleness
and
b) 'i'he existence of a clear leadership with material
resources at its disposal to spark off
and stxstain military operations.
The objective military conditions in which the movements
finds itself makes the possibility of a general uprising leading
to direct military struggle an unlikely one. Rather, as in Cuba,
the general uprising must be sparked off by organised and well
prepared guerella operations during the course of which the
masses of the people will be drawn in and armed.
Y,;e have no illusions about the difficulties which face us
in launching and successfully prosecuting guerella operations
lea. ding /2
leading to military victory. Nor do we assume that such a
struggle will he over swiftly, Fe have taken into account and
carefully wieghed numerous factors and we mention some of them:
a) ' We are faced with a powerfully armed mordern state
with tremendous industrial resources, which can,
at least in the initial period, count on the
support of three million whites. At the same
time the state is isolated practically from the
rest of the world, and if effective work is
done, will have to reply in the main on its own
resourceso The very concentration of industry
and power and the inter dependence . of the
various localities operates as both an advantage
and a disadvantage for the enemy. It
operates as a disadvantage because effective
guerella operations can within a relatively
short period create far greater economic havoc
and confusion than in a backward, decentralized
country,
b) The people are unarmed and lack personnel who
have been trained in all aspects of military
operations, A proper organisation of the
almost unlimited assistance which we can obtain
from friendljr Governments will counterbalance
its disadvantage. In the long run
a guerella struggle relies on the enemy for
its source of supply, But in order to make
this possible an initial effective arming
of the first group of guerella bands is essential,
It is also vital to place in the field
persons trained in the art of war who will
.. act as a nucleus of organisers and commanders
of guerella operations,
c) T i.e absence of friendly borders and long scale
impregnable natural bases from which to operate
are both disadvantages. Lat more important
than these factors is the support of the
people who in certain situations are better
protection than mountains and forests. In the
rural areas which become the main theatre of
guerella operations in the initial phase, the
overwhelming majority of the people will protect
and safeguard the guerellas and this
fact will to some measure negative the disad- ■
vantages. In any event we must not underestimate
the fact that there is terrain in many
^ parts of South Africa, which although not c
"""*“‘-tr;vi... clasically impregnable is suitable
for guerella
type operations≫ Boer guerellas with the
support of their people operated in the plains
of the Transvaal? Although conditions have
Ranged there is still a lesson to be learnt from
Although we must prepare for a protracted war we must not
lose sight of the fact that the political isolation of South
Africa from the world community of nations and particularly the
active hostility towards it from almost the whole of the African
Continent and the Socialist world may result in such massive
assistance
in various forms, that the state structure will collapse
far sooner than we can at the moment envisage. Direct military
intervention in South West Africa, an effective economic and
military boycott, even armed international action at some more
advanced stage of the struggle are real possibilities which will
play an important role. In no other territory where guerella
operations have been undertaken has the international situation
been such a vital faotor operating against the enemy. We are
not unaware, that there are powerful external monopoly interests
who will attempt to bolster up the white state. With effective
work they can be isolated and neutralised. The events of the
last few years have shown that the issue of racial discrimination
cuts accross world ideological conflict albeit that the
West proceeds from opportunistic premises.
The foljowing plan envisages a process which will place
in the field, at -i date fixed now, simultaneously in pre selected
areas armed and trained guerella bands who' will fiad ready
to join them local guere3 a bands
with arms and equipment at
their disposal. It will further coincide with a massive propoganda
campaign both inside and outside South Africa and a general
call for unprecedented mass struggle throughout the land, both
violent and non-violent. In tie initial period when for a short
while the military advantage will be ours the plan envisages a
massive onslaught on pre selected targets which will create ma
maximum havoc and confusion in the enemy camp and which will
inject
into the masses of the people and other friendly forces a
feeling of confidence that here at last is an army of liberation
equipped and capable of leading them to victory. In this
period the cornerstone of guerella operations is "Shameless
attack the weak end shamelessly flee from the strong".
We are convinced that this plan is capable of fullfilment.
But only if the whole apparatus of the movement both here and
abroad is mobilised for its incrementation and if every member
now prepares to make unlimited sacrifice for the achievement
of our goal. The time for small thinking is over because history
leaves us no choice,
PART 11.
OPERATION MAYIBUYE.
AREAS.
1. Port Elizabeth - \jtfzimkulu.
2. Port Shepstone — Swaziland,
3. North Western Transvaal, bordering reepectively
Beehuanaland & Limpopo.
4. North Western Cape - South West.
PLAN.
PART 111
1. Simultaneous landing of 4 groups of 30 based on our present
resources either by ship or air - armed and properly
equipped in such a way as to be self sufficient
in every respect for a least a month.
2. At the initial stages it is proposed that the 30 are
split up into platoons of 10 each to operate more or
less within a contiguous area and linking their
activities with pre arranged local groups.
3. Simultaneously with the landing of the groups of 30 and
thereafter, there should be a supply of arms and other
war material to arm the local population which become
integrated with the guerella units.
4. On landing, a detailed plan of attack on pre selected
targets with a view to taking the enemy by surprise,
creating the maximum impact on the populace, creating
as much chaos and confusion for the enemy as
possible.
5. Choice of suitable areas will be based on the nature
of the terrain, with a view to establishing temporary
4 base
areas from which our units can attack and to
which they can retreat.
6≪ Before these operations take place political authority
will Jiave been set up in secrecy in a friendly
territory with a view to supervising the struggle
both in its internal and external aspects. It is
visualised that this authority will in due course
of time develop into a Provisional Revolutionary
Government.
7. This Political Authority should trim its machinery so
that simultaneously with the commencement of operations
it will throw out massive propoganda to win
world..... ..... /2
world support for our struggle, more particularly:-
a) A complete enforcement of boycott.
b) Enlisting the support of the
international
trade union movement to refuse handling
war materials and other goods intended for
the South African Government,
c) Raising a storm at the United Nations which
should be urged to intervene militarily in
South West Africa.
d) Raiding of large scale credits for the prosecution
of the struggle.
e) Arranging for radio' facilities for daily transmission
to the world and to the people of
South Africa.
f) If possible the Political Authority should
arrange for the initial onslaught to bombard
the country or certain areas with a
flood of leaflets by plane announcing the
commencement of our armed struggle as well
as our aims, and calling upon the population
to rise against the Government.
g) Stepping up transport plans, eg. a weekly or
bi weekly airlift of trainees outside the
country in order to maintain a regular, if
small flow of trained personnel.
h) In order to facilitate the imprementation of
the military aspect of the plan it is propose
the National High Command appoint personenel
to be quartered at Bar under the
auspiees of the office there.
PART IV.
INTERNAL ORGANISATION.
In preparation for the commencement of operations when our
external team lands, intensive as well as extensive work will
have been done. "For instance, guerella units will have been
set up in the main areas mapped out in Part 1 above as well as in
the other areas away from the immediate scene of operation.
Progressively sabotage activity throughout the country will
be stepped up before thee operations. Political pressure too,
in the meanwhile will be stepped up in conjunction with the
sabotage
activity.
In furtherence of the general ideas set out above the plan
for internal organisation is along the following pattern:-
I 7--.............. /3
Our target is that on arrival the external force should
find at least 7,000 men in the four main areas ready
to join the guerella army in the initial onslaught.
These will be allocated as follows
a) Eastern Cape - Transkei 2,000
b) Natal - Zululand 2,000
c) North Western Transvaal 2,000
d) North Western Cape 1,000
To realise our target in each of the main areas it is
proposed that each of the four areas should have an
overall command whose task it will be to divide its
area into regions, which in turn will be allocated a
figure in proportion to their relative importance.
The preparation for equipping the initial force envisaged
in 1 above will take place in three stages,
thus:-
a) By importation of military supply at two levels:
i) Build up of fire arms, ammunition and
explosives by maintaining a regular
flow over a period of time.
ii) By landing additional supplies
Simula
taneously with the arrival of our external
force.
b) Acquisition and accumulation internally of fire
arms, ammunition and explosives at all levels
of our organisation.
c) Collection and accumulation of other military
sup'plies such as food, medicines, communication
equipment etc.
It is proposed that auxilliary guerella/sabotage units
in the four main areas be set up before and after the
commencement of operations. They may engage in activities
that may serve to disperse the enemy forces,
assist to maintain the fighting ability of the guerellas
as well as draw in the masses in support of the
guerellas.
It is proposed that in areas falling outside the four
main guerella areas M.K. units should be set up and
act in support of the activities in the guerella
areas, and to harass the enemy.
In order to draw in the masses of the population the
political wing should arouse the people to participate
in the struggles that are designed to create an upheave!
throughout the country.
PART A
PART V.
DETAILED PLAN OP IMPREMENTATION.
In order to implement.the plans set out above in Parts 1 to
III we establish Departments which are to be charged with duties
to study and submit detailed reports and plans in respect of
each of their Departments with the following terms of reference:-
1. INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT.
This Committee will be required to study and report
on the following:
a) The exact extent of each area.
b) The portions of the country that are naturally
suited for our operations and their location
within each area.
c) Points along the coast which would be suitable
for landing of men and supplies and how
these are going to be transferred from the
point of landing to the area of operations.
d) The situation of enemy forces in each area, thus:-
i) The Military and the Police as well their
strength.
ii) Military and Police camps, and towns and the
■ distances between them,
iii) System of all forms of communication in the
area,
iv) The location of trading stations and chiefs
and headmen's kraals.
v) Air fields and air strips in the areas.
e) Selection of targets to be tackled in initial
phase of guerella operations with a view to
causing maximum damage to the enemy as well
as preventing the quick deployment of reenforcements.
In its study the Committee should bear in mind the following
main targets:-
i) Strategic road, railways and other communi
‘ cations.
ii)- Power stations.
iii) Police stations, camps and military forces.
iv) Major industrial installations.
v) Irredeemable Goverment stooges.
f) A study of climatic conditions in relation to
seasons, as v/ell as diseases common to the
area.
g) The population distribution in the areas as
well as the main crops.
h) Rivers and dams.
i) And generally all other relevant matters.
2. External......... /5
PART V.
DETAILED PLAN OP IMPREMENTATION.
In order to implement.the plans set out above in Parts 1 to
III we establish Departments which are to be charged with duties
to study and submit detailed reports and plans in respect of
each of their Departments with the following terms of reference:-
1. INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT.
This Committee will be required to study and report
on the following:
a) The exact extent of each area.
b) The portions of the country that are naturally
suited for our operations and their location
within each area.
c) Points along the coast which would be suitable
for landing of men and supplies and how
these are going to be transferred from the
point of landing to the area of operations.
d) The situation of enemy forces in each area, thus:-
i) The Military and the Police as well their
strength.
ii) Military and Police camps, and towns and the
■ distances between them,
iii) System of all forms of communication in the
area,
iv) The location of trading stations and chiefs
and headmen's kraals.
v) Air fields and air strips in the areas.
e) Selection of targets to be tackled in initial
phase of guerella operations with a view to
causing maximum damage to the enemy as well
as preventing the quick deployment of reenforcements.
In its study the Committee should bear in mind the following
main targets:-
i) Strategic road, railways and other communi
‘ cations.
ii)- Power stations.
iii) Police stations, camps and military forces.
iv) Major industrial installations.
v) Irredeemable Goverment stooges.
f) A study of climatic conditions in relation to
seasons, as v/ell as diseases common to the
area.
g) The population distribution in the areas as
well as the main crops.
h) Rivers and dams.
i) And generally all other relevant matters.
2. External......... /5
1*0 THE GUERELLA AREAS.
a) To map out regions in each area with a view to organising
Regional and District Commands and M.K.
units,
b) To achieve this we strongly recommend the employment
of 10 full tino organisers in each area.
c) The organisers shall "be directly responsible to the
National High Command.
d) The N.H.C. is directed to recruit and arrange for the
external training of at least 300 men in the next
two months.
PERSONNEL.
a) Intelligence Alex Set-iundus Otto.
b) External Planning Committee Johnson, Thabo and Joseph
together with a senior
A.N.C. rep, as well as ooopted
personnel seconded
to us by friendly Govts.
c) Transport Committee Percy Seoundus Mbata.
d) Logistics Dept. Bri-bri secundus Prank.
SPECIAL DIRECTIVES TO HEADS OP DEPARTMENTS
The Heads of Departments are required to submit not later
than 30-th May, 1963,-plans detailing:-
a) The structural organisation of their Department.
b) The type and number of personnel they require to
be allocated to them and their duties and
functions.
c) The funds required for their work both for immediate
and long term purposes.
d) Schedule of time required to enable them to fullfill
given targets and what these are.
e) Other matters relating to the efficient execution of
of the Departments' Plans.
ORGANISATION OP AREAS, ORGANISERS AND SETTING UP OF PROPER
M.K. MACHINERY.
Rathau and James for this task.
Collection Number: AD1844
State vs Nelson Mandela and 9 Others (Rivonia Trial)
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Location:- Johannesburg
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