Land Grabbing in Africa and
the New Politics of Food
Introduction
‘Africa is for sale’ is how some characterise it;
there is a ‘land grab’ underway. Others are more
cautious, speaking of ‘large-scale land acquisitions’, while the World Bank notes euphemistically the ‘rising global interest in farmland’.
Whatever the prevailing terminology and
ideologies, there is now ample evidence that
large swathes of African farmland are being
allocated to investors, usually on long-term
leases, at a rate not seen for decades—indeed,
not since the colonial period. The fact that much
of this land is being acquired to provide for the
future food and fuel needs of foreign nations
has, not surprisingly, led to allegations that a
neo - coloni a l push b y more wea l thy and
powerful nations is underway to annex the
continent’s key natural resources.
While no solid dataset tells us precisely the
scale and distribution of the phenomenon, all
the major studies conducted so far confirm that
Africa is the global centre of land grabbing. The
World Bank’s study released in September 2010
identified 45 million hectares under negotiation
for allocation during 2009 alone, of which 70
percent (about 32 million hectares) was in
Africa.
1
A new study by the International Land
Coalition suggests that the true figure could be
much higher, at around 80 million hectares, 64
percent (about 50 million hectares) of these in
Africa.
2
Why? What Are the Drivers?
This dramatic rise in land acquisitions across
Africa and elsewhere originates from three main
drivers, which are reflected in the term ‘the
triple-F crisis’: food, fuel and finance.
First is the food crisis. The food price spikes
of 2007/8 showed just how vulnerable foodimporting nations are to fluctuations in global
commodity markets. These led many, including
the Gulf States and several east Asian countries,
to re-evaluate their strategies and secure land
and water elsewhere, essentially turning to
‘offshore’ food production to supply their
growing populations. This food crisis plunged
an extra hundred million people globally into
hunger, from which most have not recovered.
This situation has set back by many years develo p m e n t e f f o r t s t o w a r d s M i l l e n n i u m
Development Goal 1: to eradicate extreme
poverty and hunger.
Second is the fuel crisis. Rising and fluctuating
oil prices in the period 2007–09, and the realisation that we might have hit peak oil production,
created powerful incentives for companies to
acquire land for the production of ‘agrofuel’ or
b i o f u e l ’ c r o p s . Fo r e m o s t a m o n g t h e s e
Policy Brief 041 | June 2011 www.future-agricultures.org
Policy BriefPolicy Brief 041 | June 2011
feedstocks are jatropha, palm oil, maize and soya
for biodiesel; and sugarcane for bioethanol.
Compounding the rush towards biofuels are
policies like the European Union’s target of 10
percent renewable content in its fuel stocks by
2020, which by itself constitutes very substantial
demand for renewables. Globally, the World
Bank found that 21 percent of land deals in 2009
w e r e fo r b i o f u e l p r o d u c t i o n , w h i l e t h e
I n ter na t iona l L and Coa l i t ion’s ( I LC ) more
updated figures put this higher, at 44 percent.
There is also substantial regional variation, with
Southern Africa being called ‘the new Middle
East of biofuels’.
3
Third is the financial crisis. The meltdown in
international financial markets in late 2009 and
the subsequent recession led investors to
consider those markets volatile and risky. Many
sought to invest in the more tangible asset of
farmland, with the promise that rising demand
for food and fuel would make this a secure
investment in an increasingly unpredictable
global system. While some may have long-term
plans for these investments, others are clearly
speculators, bargaining on short-term gains.
Private equity groups have established ‘farmland funds’, buying up portfolios of land in
numerous countries and promising their clients
returns of 30 percent per annum over a five-year
period. This figure is entirely unrelated to actual
farm production, but is based on cheaply
acquired land and a gamble on projected
growth in demand for farmland, which will
create secondary markets for further transfers
of these leases to other buyers.
Some analysts are now pointing to a fourth
driver, the growth of carbon markets. Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation
(REDD) is an instrument that emphasises the
strategic importance of controlling forested
land—and most of Africa’s savannah can be
counted as natural forest for these purposes. So
as well as acquiring land to cultivate, investors
are looking to acquire land to not cultivate, in
order to earn carbon credits.
Why Africa?
Why Africa is at the centre of this new trend is
disputed. One reason put forward is that Africa’s
land is empty and available. Much of Africa’s land
is under-utilised and ripe for commercialisation,
according to the World Bank’s 2009 report
entitled Awakening Africa’s Sleeping Giant:
Prospects for Commercial Agriculture in the
Guinea Savannah Zone and Beyond. It argues
that this region of the Guinea Savannah,
stretching across most of inland west Africa
across to the horn, through much of central
Africa and down the east coast to Mozambique,
constitutes ‘one of the world’s largest underused
land reserves’.
4
The report suggests that it will
be key to meeting growing food demand as the
world’s population rises to nine billion by 2050.
Because of low population densities and limited
mobility, much of this commercialisation will
need to be based on large-scale commercial
agriculture, the Bank argues.
The Land Is Cheap—or Even Free
An alternative explanation for why Africa is such
an attractive destination for investors—mooted
by both proponents and critics of land deals—is
that the land is so cheap; sometimes, even free.
Private equity groups explicitly sell their African
farmland investment funds to prospective
clients by pointing out that land on the continent is ‘undervalued’ and therefore an excellent
investment.
Indeed, what is a ‘market’ price for customary
land cleared of its inhabitants and leased by a
government? Many deals involve renewable
leases for twenty-five, fifty or even ninety-nine
years, in return for small payments made to
nat iona l, prov inc i a l or loc a l gover nment.
Sometimes once-off compensation for local
people is included—with, of course, the promise
of jobs and construction of new infrastructure. Policy Brief 041 | June 2011
Yet after the land is acquired, enforcement of
promises made remains a challenge, especially
as investors’ choices about how and how much
to invest are framed by factors far outside the
control of host governments.
But the Land Is Not Empty
Mounting evidence shows that much of the land
being allocated on long-term leases or concessions to investors is already occupied and
used—mostly by Africa’s eighty million smallscale farmers, who supply most of Africa’s food
needs and produce 30 percent of its GDP. While
powerful narratives rationalising such deals
emphasise that land being targeted is ‘idle land’
or ‘wasteland’, case studies suggest that these
terms often reflect an assessment of the productivity, rather than the existence, of current land
uses.
The International Institute for Environment
and Development, for instance, found that in
Ethiopia, all land allocations recorded at the
national investment promotion agency are classified as involving ‘wastelands’, with no preexisting users. But in a country with a population
of about seventy-five million, the vast majority
of whom live in rural areas,
5
this formal classification is open to question. Indeed, shifting cultivat i o n a n d d r y - s e a s o n g r a z i n g h a ve b e e n
widespread in these regions, but have gone
unacknowledged by officials in charge of leasing
out land. Now, a growing body of more detailed
case studies shows the extent to which smallscale farmers have been displaced; pastoralists
have lost their grazing land; and rural people
have lost access to crucial common property
resources. In sum, even land that is not farmed
is often used by and important to the survival
of local communities. Thus, discourses about
‘empt y land ’ are deeply and dangerously
misleading.
The World Bank hoped that commercialisation would focus on more marginal regions,
br ing ing un- or under -ut i l i sed l and in to
production and increasing overall output.
However, research now sugests that investors
are favouring areas with higher rainfall and proximity to urban centres and transport infrastructure—in other words, those areas already most
prized by existing small-scale farmers.
Who Is Doing the Grabbing?
While much attention has been given to ‘foreign
companies’ acquiring farmland, in fact a range
of actors has proliferated, including multinational companies, sovereign wealth funds
(notably from Europe and the Gulf States),
pr i v a te equi t y funds and other f inanc i a l
institutions.
This recent wave of ‘land grabbing’ has
wi tnes sed not onl y European and No r th
American actors seeking out farmland deals, but
also the rise of ‘south-south’ deals, with the BRICS
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South
Africa) becoming more significant. At the recent
Conference on Global Land Grabbing hosted
by the Land Deal Politics Initiative (LDPI) at the
University of Sussex, UK, several detailed case
studies showed how regional economic powers
are emerging as more significant actors: Brazil
in Latin America, South Africa in Africa, China
(as well as India and South Korea) in Asia, and
so on. It is to be expected that, with the rise of
regional powers, the old north-south dynamic
should shift, bringing about new opportunities
but also threats and dynamics that need to be
understood and engaged with.
Further, while the world’s attention has been
drawn to the entry of ‘foreign’ actors, emerging
evidence shows that many of the land deals have
been secured by domestic capital. This operates
in the form of private companies, sometimes in
partnership with government investment
corporations and other parastatals, and sometimes also in partnership with foreign companies and financiers. And even if the land is
allocated to private companies, it is the states
themselves (usually national governments) that Policy Brief 041 | June 2011
are doing the ‘grabbing’ of land from citizens
with weak or unregistered rights.
Most important, though, is not the identity
of the investors, but rather the nature of the
deals, the types of land use changes they bring
about, and how these contribute to fundamental shifts in the structure of these largely
agrarian economies. Who wins, who loses, and
what does this mean for the future of rural
economies and rural poverty in Africa?
A Minefield of Controversies
Land grabbing has prompted many to criticise
the high levels of corruption involved in securing
large-scale land deals, but the concerns extend
far beyond this. Changes in land use may alter
the amount of food being produced for local
markets, and so might reduce food availability.
Threats to biodiversity and loss of environmental
services constitute another concern. Large
commercial deals typically involve the transition
from multiple land uses, intercropping and lowlevel use of forest products to forest clearance
and monocropping.
But there are several other key debates about
land deals, four of which are highlighted here:
land rights, gender, water and bilateral investment treaties.
Land rights are a precondition for any legitimate land deal. Yet in many cases, the land rights
of existing users have been violated. This
tendency has been widespread, not only in
Africa, where most people hold land under
forms of customary tenure, but also in Asia and
Latin America. Land deals have prompted loss—
and not only of cultivated land, where food
production for consumption and for local
markets is displaced. Even where land is not
farmed, researchers and non-governmental
organisations have pointed to the devastating
impacts of land deals on pastoralist communities in regions of west Africa, and also in the
horn (notably Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan), when
their customary grazing lands have been privatised and fenced.
Despite talk of ‘land grabbing by foreigners’,
those doing the grabbing are in most instances
national governments—though also sometimes
state or local authorities, traditional leaders and
other local power brokers. For this reason, some
kind of registration of community land rights
might be advantageous to help guard against
Kenya’s Tana River delta, a biodiversity hotspot, is home to small-scale cultivators (Pokomo) and
pastoralists (Oromo and Wardei). The delta is under unprecedented threat as corporations and
foreign agencies scramble to exploit its riches for export crops, biofuels and minerals. So far, 40,000
hectares have been allocated for a monoculture sugar cane plantation, and further proposed deals
include 90,000 hectares for a Canadian-based biofuels company to grow jatropha curcas; 120,000
hectares to Qatar to grow food crops; and 20,000 hectares to a Canadian mining company to mine
titanium, among others. While the delta provides immense environmental services to the country,
and livelihoods to its inhabitants, these developments may lead to the collapse of most of its
services, and displace settled farmers and fence off the grazing land of pastoralists. More than
25,000 people living in 30 villages will be evicted from their ancestral land due to the first of these
deals alone.
Source: Nunow, Abdirizak. 2011. The Dynamics of Land Deals in the Tana Delta, Kenya. Paper
presented at the International Conference on Global Land Grabbing, University of Sussex, UK, 6-8
April 2011.
Text box 1: Competing claims in KenyaPolicy Brief 041 | June 2011
governments displacing landholders in favour
of investors—though problematic experiences
with titling customary lands in Africa suggests
that this is not a simple solution, either.
Most disturbing is the finding of several
studies that the new investors are favouring host
countries where governance is weak, politicians
corruptible, and land rights of existing users
weak in law and practice. Rather than seeking
secure political environments (which some may
favour), many are opting for precisely those
destinations where local people can be easily
removed from their land. This is one of the key
findings of the World Bank report: surveying
fourteen countries across three continents, it
found a strong negative correlation between
good governance on land rights and investor
interest. In short, for many (though obviously
not all) investors, it’s easier and cheaper to rely
on local people being displaced than to engage
in negotiations and partnerships with them.
Gender is one of the most important criteria
for understanding the true, and varied, impacts
of land deals. As a recent study from the
International Food Policy Research Institute
(IFPRI) shows, women are most likely to carry
the brunt of land loss, given their primary role
in providing food for household subsistence.
Men, by contrast, are most likely to benefit from
a c ces s to emplo ymen t in pl an t a t ions or
processing plants.
6
Where people are displaced,
the costs of rebuilding livelihoods and ensuring
social reproduction fall disproportionately on
women, and gender relations are likely to
become more unequal as a result. Rather than
assuming then that all in rural communities are
equal and will benefit or suffer equally, gender
is one among other dimensions of social differentiation that must be understood, in context,
i n o r d e r t o i n f o r m a p p r o p r i a t e p o l i c y
alternatives.
Water is a central but often ignored component of land deals. The right of investors to
access the water required to cultivate acquired
land is embedded within land leases, but is
seldom paid for. Most investors favour land with
good access to water and the potential for irrigation: contrary to the World Bank’s expectations
of commercialisation in the Guinea Savannah
zone, little of the investment is for rainfed cropping. Given that much of the continent is
projected to become more water-scarce in the
future, the impacts of land deals on other water
users, now and into the future, are critical areas
In Tanzania, 640,000 hectares have been allocated for biofuels production – for jatropha curcas,
sugar cane and palm oil – and potential investors have applied for a total of 4 million hectares. The
areas targeted are forested areas on which villagers depend for food and livestock grazing – a crucial
source of livelihood. Although the Village Land Act of 2009 requires that people be compensated for
any land loss, the processes for consulting on this, and determining the level and manner of
payment of compensation, has been fraught with conflict, not least because much of the compensation is paid to state authorities rather than local people. Investments based on outgrower models
have reportedly been less conflictual and secured more local support. Following widespread
opposition to land allocation to biofuels investors, and evidence of people being dispossessed, the
government imposed a moratorium on new projects, and developed in consultation with civil
society a set of National Biofuels Guidelines to address concerns about the displacement of local
people and the shift from food to fuel production.
Source: Sulle, Emmanuel and Fred Nelson. 2009. Biofuels, land access and rural livelihoods in
Tanzania. London: International Institute for Environment and Development.
Text box 2: Biofuels in TanzaniaPolicy Brief 041 | June 2011
for investigation. The presence of large, corporate water users will likely spark conflicts
between competing uses and users—as has
already been seen in the volatile regions around
the shrinking Lake Chad.
7
Bi lateral inves tment t reat ies a re f a s t
becoming the most significant determinants of
the relative powers of investors vis-à-vis national
governments. The International Institute for
Sustainable Development (IISD), based in
Geneva, has found that the terms of the land
deals, and the legal frameworks that govern
them, impose restrictions on important areas
of policy such as land, food, agriculture and
trade.
8
Put simply, African governments are
making deals that will tie their hands in terms
of making needed policy changes for years, even
decades, to come.
Experience with international arbitration of
di sputes bet ween inves tor s and nat iona l
governments shows that investors’ rights to
export their produce (even in times of food
shortage) and to use water (even in the face of
rising water scarcity) typically trump the rights
of governments to protect their citizens’ basic
needs. Most government-to-investor contracts
do not stipulate that investors sell to domestic
markets, and government efforts at export
restrictions in times of acute food shortages
would likely be illegal under international investment and trade law.
Implications for the future
All of the above conjures a worrying spectre,
fuelling outrage over the actions of investors,
as well as of national governments and local
elites. What we are witnessing may well turn out
to be a non-reversible corporatisation of African
agriculture that will displace some of the poorest
and most vulnerable citizens, undermining local
food production and food security in favour of
capital-intensive and labour-displacing production systems of food and other goods, mostly
for foreign markets.
To the extent this is happening, it is the antithesis of land reform, in that it concentrates control
in fewer hands; and of agrarian reform, in that
it tilts the scales in favour of those who control
input and output markets, and undermines selfsufficiency. It is ironic indeed that these changes
are underway at precisely the time that the
African Union, among others, has embraced a
vision of smallholder-led agricultural commercialisation and a ‘green revolution in Africa’. Yet
this period—characterised by the conjuncture
of global market failures in food, fuel and financial markets and weak governance over African
land rights—could well see the patterns of accumulation becoming narrower and food security
being undermined in Africa.
Policy Responses
At a global multilateral level, three frameworks
have been proposed. The UN’s Food and
Agricultural Organization (FAO) is spearheading
a multi-agency initiative to establish a set of
Vo l u n t a r y G u i d e l i n e s f o r R e s p o n s i b l e
Governance of Land and other Natural Resource
Rights (‘voluntary guidelines’). The first draft,
published in April 2011, was the output of
consultation with governments and civil society
organisations over several years in each continent and within regions. These guidelines
adopted a human rights-based approach, referencing existing international human rights law,
and are premised on securing existing users’
rights.
In contrast, the World Bank has, with partners,
proposed a set of Seven Responsible Agricultural
Investment Principles, representing a code of
conduct for investors and their financial backers
(‘RAI principles’). Building on the corporate
social responsibility models of the roundtables
for soy and palm oil, this set of principles emphasises community consultation. But it is a proposal
by technocrats within the bank and other institutions. No civil society groups have been
involved in developing it, none of it would be Policy Brief 041 | June 2011
enforceable, and it’s unclear which institution
could or would be mandated to monitor it. At
present, it is under discussion by the Committee
on World Food Security as a possible adjunct to
the voluntary guidelines.
In response to this debate, the UN Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Food published Ten
Minimum Principles for Land-based Investments.
These include procedural requirements such as
informed participation of local communities, as
well as substantive norms such as benefitsharing and ensuring that states’ human rights
obligations take precedence over land deals.
The rapporteur argues that it is wrong and
misleading to contrast the efficiency of largescale corporate agriculture with that of the
existing smallholder sector. Given decades of
neglect of smallholder farming, first by newly
independent governments and then by states
undergoing donor-imposed structural adjustment programmes, the existing smallholder
sector in no way reflects its potential for broadbased and poverty-reducing growth.
9
That
people survive in this way shows their lack of
feasible alternatives, which is why their displacement in favour of new production regimes is so
unconscionable.
Within Africa, several overlapping processes
a re under way. The Af r i c an Union, hav ing
adopted the AU Land Policy Guidelines in 2009,
is working with the UN Economic Commission
for Africa and the African Development Bank to
operationalise these principles at regional levels
and in member states. These bodies urge that
land laws and policies be tightened up to protect
land users.
The Pan-African Parliament is convening a
ser ies of meet ings through the reg iona l
economic commissions (RECs) in southern, east,
central and west Africa, to brief parliamentarians
from these regions about land grabbing and to
consider a legislative and policy response.
Several civil society organisations—Action
A i d , O x f a m , t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Land Coalition—are working with local farmers’
associations to generate responses and alternative proposals for regulation of land deals, and
for pro-smallholder agricultural policy that calls
for investment in existing farmers, rather than
in the land. Some are building on the Dakar
Appeal Against Land Grabbing, adopted at the
World Social Forum in Senegal in February 2011.
In Europe, too, campaigns are underway by
the Food First International Action Network
(FIAN), Transnational Institute (TNI) and partners, urging European citizens to ‘follow their
money’ and ask critical questions of European
companies and banks, to find out what land
acquisitions in the developing world are being
supported through their investments and
through their consumption patterns, and what
the true costs of these are.
Fundamentally, the debates about land grabbing—as diverse as they are—gravitate around
two basic positions. One is that the challenge
is to ensure good governance and establish
robust institutions, so that deals are concluded
responsibly and investors are held to account.
In other words, large-scale land deals can be
reformed to produce win-win outcomes. This is
the view advanced by the World Bank and US
Agency for International Development, among
others.
A competing view is that ‘good governance’
is not enough. As the UN Special Rapporteur,
Olivier de Schutter, has argued, this view—
which underpins the RAI proposals—is based
on the idea of ‘destroying the global peasantry
responsibly’. He proposes that what is needed
is not merely regulation to curb the corrupt
excesses of land grabbing, but a substantive
alternative that provides a new direction for
agrarian change; opposes corporate control of
food production and distribution; and promotes
types of agriculture that are inclusive, pro-poor,
smallholder-based, poverty-reducing and
hunger-eliminating. Conclusion
Africa, a continent plagued by chronic food
insecurity, is now considered to be the future
breadbasket of the world, and is expected to
help meet its rising food needs. In the process
of cashing in on the opportunities offered by
cheap land and water, large-scale investors are
displacing land uses and land users in ways that
could aggravate the already severe challenges
of rural poverty and hunger.
The rise of ‘land grabbing’ or ‘responsible
agricultural investment’ in Africa is undoubtedly
one of the great challenges of our time for development in the continent. The deals being made
now are remaking the map of food production
and food distribution, in Africa and globally.
What happens over the next few years—acceleration or reversal, regulation or laissez-faire,
better governance or substantive changes in
agricultural policy—will determine to a great
extent the future of poverty and hunger in
Africa.
Endnotes:
1
World Bank, Rising Global Interest in Farmland: Can it
Yield Sustainable and Equitable Benefits?, Washington DC:
World Bank, 2010.
2
ILC (International Land Coalition), ‘Commercial pressures
on land’, PowerPoint presentation at the Conference on
Global Land Grabbing hosted by the Land Deal Politics
Initiative at the Institute of Development Studies,
University of Sussex, UK, 6-8 April 2011, 2010.
3
Richardson B, ‘Big Sugar in southern Africa: rural
development and the perverted potential of sugar/
ethanol exports’, Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol 37, No 4,
2010, pp. 917-938.
4
World Bank, Awakening Africa’s Sleeping Giant: Prospects
for Commercial Agriculture in the Guinea Savannah Zone
and Beyon, Washington DC: World Bank, 2009, p. 2.
5
Lorenzo C, Vermeulen S, Leonard R & Keeley J, Land grab
or development opportunity? Agricultural investment and
international land deals in Africa. London/Rome:
International Institute for Environment and Development,
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations,
and International Fund for Agricultural Development,
2009.
6
IFPRI (International Food Policy Research Institute),
Gender implications of large-scale land acquisition, Policy
brief, Washington DC: IFPRI, April 2010.
7
Woodhouse P & Ganho A.S, ‘Is Water the Hidden Agenda
of Agricultural Land Acquisition in sub-Saharan Africa?’,
Paper presented at the Conference on Global Land
Grabbing hosted by the Land Deal Politics Initiative at the
Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, UK,
6-8 April 2011, 2010.
8
Mahnaz M, ‘Foreign investment into agriculture:
Investment Treaties and the ability of governments to
balance rights and obligations between foreign investors
and local communities’, Paper presented at the Conference
on Global Land Grabbing hosted by the Land Deal Politics
Initiative at the Institute of Development Studies,
University of Sussex, UK, 6-8 April 2011, 2010.
9
De Schutter O, ‘How not to think of land-grabbing: three
critiques of large-scale investments in farmland’, Journal of
Peasant Studies, Vol 38, No 2, March 2011, pp. 249-279.
Sources:
Ruth Hall is a senior researcher at the Institute for Poverty,
Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) at the University of the
Western Cape, South Africa.
Policy Brief 041 | June 2011 www.future-agricultures.org
Acknowledgements:
This Policy Brief was written by Ruth Hall of the Future Agricultures Consortium. The series editor is David Hughes. Further
information about this series of Policy Briefs at: www. future-agricultures.org
The Future Agricultures Consortium aims to encourage critical debate and policy dialogue on the future of agriculture in
Africa. The Consortium is a partnership between research-based organisations across Africa and in the UK.
Future Agricultures Consortium Secretariat at the University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RE UK T +44 (0) 1273 915670
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